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the factors favoring such treatment are not prevalent, and there
are weighty factors against it. 44 But the growing line of tax
jurisprudence represented by the instant case provides considerable precedent for freedom of review if inarticulated considerations should call for it.
Frederick W. Ellis
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

DUE PROCESS -

BLOOD TEST

The truck petitioner was driving collided with an automobile
on a New Mexico highway. Three occupants of the automobile
were killed and petitioner was seriously injured. He was taken
to a hospital where a physician rembved a sample of his blood
at the request of a state patrolman. The blood sample was taken
with a hypodermic needle while petitioner was unconscious. Over
his objection, evidence of this blood test, showing that petitioner
was under the influence of alcohol, was introduced at his trial.
After his conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico denied a writ of habeas corpus. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held, affirmed.
Petitioner's conviction, based on the result of the involuntary
blood test, did not deprive him of his liberty without that due
process of law guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution.' Breithauptv. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957).
It has long been settled that the due process provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Federal Bill of
Rights 2 as restrictions upon the powers of the states.3 On the
ence of the Social Security Administrator was factual, although involving broad
statutory terms.
44. Many administrative agencies clearly possess delegated legislative authority, whereas Congress, in creating the "clearly erroneous" rule, apparently intended
that the Tax Court should not have such authority. The expertise argument (favoring non-substitution on highly technical questions), while often present in tax
matters, is more clearly and consistently present in reviewing the findings of such
agencies as the ICC, FCC, and SEC. The strong precedent of such cases as
O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504 (1951) (statutory construction
of ultimate fact inferences considered fact and subject to substantial evidence rule)
would discourage any large scale law classification under the substantial evidence
rule.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I-VIII.
3. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947).
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contrary, as expressed by Mr. Justice Cardozo, due process of
law is a constitutional guarantee only of those personal immunities which are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental," '4 or are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." 5 The Supreme Court has applied this
test to the protections embodied in the Fourth6 and Fifth7
Amendments and held that these amendments as such do not
apply to the states, but that some of the protections included in
them are so basic that they are embraced within the due process
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Thus, if use of the
involuntary blood test by the State of New Mexico in the instant
case violated petitioner's rights under the Federal Constitution,
the violation was of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The
guarantee of "due process of law" set forth in this amendment is
difficult to define. On one occasion the Court said that the principle precludes defining more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend "a sense of
justice." In two relatively recent cases the Supreme Court in
applying this test reached opposite conclusions. In Adamson v.
California'° the Court held that comment by the state upon the
accused's failure to testify did not violate the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, in
Rochin v. California" the Court found that the forcible use of a
stomach pump to obtain morphine capsules from the accused was
conduct "bound to offend even hardened sensibilities"' 2 and was
violative of due process.
In the instant case the majority of the Court found that
4. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
5. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
7. U.S. CONBT. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
8. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
9. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
10. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
11. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
12. Id. at 172.
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there is nothing brutal or offensive in taking blood when it is
done under the protective eye of a physician." On this ground
the majority distinguished the Rochin case. However, as Mr.
Chief Justice Warren pointed out in his dissenting opinion, in
both cases the operation was performed by a doctor in a hospital.
The only basic difference is that Rochin was conscious and able
to protest and Breithaupt was unconscious and unable to protest.
Would the result in the Rochin case have been different if Rochin
had been given a sedative before having his stomach pumped?
Certainly, elimination of the need for force could not alter the
fact that the privacy of his body was invaded without his consent in order to secure evidence upon which he was convicted.
It is true that the use of force is unquestionably an aggravating
element. However, the presence or absence of violence should
not be the determinative factor in deciding whether a conviction
has been brought about by methods which "offend a sense of
justice." Rather, it seems that any conviction based upon evidence obtained from the person of the accused without his
knowledge or consent should be set aside. This is equally true
whether the evidence is in the form of capsules from his stomach
or blood from his veins. Perhaps, as the Chief Justice's dissent
indicated, the Court was motivated by a desire to help curb the
alarming death rate on the American highways. Prevention of
highway deaths, like the effort to apprehend dangerous criminals, is of course laudable. But the civil liberties limited in this
case were not designed for efficiency and should not be set aside
for convenience.
Albert L. Dietz, Jr.
LABOR LAW

-

RIGHT TO STRIKE DURING REOPENING

NEGOTIATIONS WHILE CONTRACT IS STILL IN EFFECT

A collective bargaining agreement between the company and
the union was to remain in effect until October 23, 1951, and
thereafter until cancelled in the manner prescribed by the contract. The party desiring cancellation was first required to give
a sixty-day notice of desire to amend the contract. Then, if no
agreement on proposed amendments was reached during this
first sixty-day period, either party could cancel the contract by
giving a second sixty-day notice. Sixty days prior to October 23,
1951, the union gave notification of desire to modify the agree13. Breithhaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408, 410 (1957).

